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The Lithuanian-Polish Dispute and the Great Powers, 1918-1923 
In the wake of World War I, Europe was a political nightmare. Although the 
Armistice of 1918 effectively ended the Great War, peace in Eastern Europe was far from 
assured. The sudden, unexpected end of the war, combined with the growing threat of 
communist revolution throughout Europe created an unsettling atmosphere during the 
interwar period. The Great Powers-the victorious Allied forces of France, Great Britain, 
Italy, and the United States-met at Paris to reconstruct Europe. In particular, the Great 
Powers had numerous territorial questions to resolve. One of the most fascinating 
territorial struggles concerned the city of Vilnius (Vilna in Russian, Wilno in Polish), 
located at the confluence of the Neris (Russian Viliya) and Vilnia rivers. Possession of 
the city of Vilnius, the ancient and current capital of Lithuania, and its surrounding region 
sparked an intense conflict between Poland and Lithuania. 
On Feb. 16, 1918, the Lithuanian National Council (Taryba), which had been 
formed in 1917, proclaimed Lithuania's independence and set up a national government. 
Although formal German recognition was secured in March, real independence was not 
achieved until the German collapse in the west in November. At that time, Lithuania's 
frontiers had not been clearly established, and unresolved border questions characterized 
Lithuania's foreign relations throughout the interwar period. As the Germans began to 
withdraw after the armistice of November 11, 1918, the newly independent Lithuanian 
government was faced with an invasion by the Soviets from the east. On January 5, 1919, 
the Red Army occupied Vilnius and a communist Lithuanian government was installed. 
The national government was evacuated to the city of Kaunas. The national government, 
protected by German forces that remained in western Lithuania on instructions from the 
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Great Powers, succeeded in organizing an army, which began to push the Soviets out of 
the country. 
The problem of Vilnius and its surrounding region bedeviled Polish-Lithuanian 
relations. Modem Lithuanian nationalism was based on a fusion of ethnicity and historic 
identity. Vilnius, the capital of the historic state, was a multiethnic city with a heavily 
Polish cultural veneer. Many in Poland, while not averse to Lithuania's claim, felt that 
Lithuania itself had historically become a part of a wider Polish cultural realm and sought 
to resurrect some form of the common political entity that had existed until 1795. For 
many Poles, Lithuania had become a part of their country. Others considered that, if the 
Lithuanians were to set up an independent state based on the principle of ethnic 
population, Vilnius-with its large Polish population-should become a part of Poland. 
One strong supporter of Vilnius' incorporation into Poland was the Polish head of state, 
Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, who stemmed from a Polonized Lithuanian noble family. On 
April 20, 1919, the Polish army took Vilnius from the Red Army and prevented the 
Lithuanians from reoccupying the city. The Lithuanians rejected the demands for union 
with Poland, and hostilities were avoided only by the Great Powers' creation of a 
demarcation line (the Foch Line) to separate the armies of the two countries. According 
to the Foch Line, Vilnius was left in Polish hands. 
In the June 1920 the Red Army reoccupied Vilnius while pushing the Poles back 
to Warsaw. On July 12 1920, Soviet Russia ceded the city to Lithuania. Subsequently, 
violence broke out between Lithuania and Poland. The League of Nations arranged a 
partial armistice (Oct. 7, 1920) that put Vilnius under Lithuanian control and called for 
negotiations to settle all remaining border disputes between the two countries. Two days 
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later the Polish general Lucjan Zeligowski drove the Lithuanian troops out, proclaimed 
the independence of central Lithuania, and established its government at Vilnius. For the 
next year and a half, negotiations continued under the aegis of the League of Nations, 
which finally abandoned its role as mediator on Jan. 13, 1922. 
Five days earlier, however, General Zeligowski, again prompted by Pilsudski, 
called for elections for a regional Diet, which on February 20, 1922 voted to incorporate 
central Lithuania into Poland. Subsequently, Poland unilaterally incorporated the city and 
its surrounding region. That arrangement was later accepted by the League's council, 
which set the border almost along the Foch Line (Feb. 3, 1923)-a decision that was 
confirmed on March 15 by the conference of ambassadors of the Allied Powers. 
Lithuania, however, rejected the settlement and, on the basis of the continuing Vilnius 
dispute, refused to arrange regular diplomatic relations with Poland. Only in 1938, under 
the pressure of a Polish ultimatum (issued March 17), did Lithuania agree to receive a 
Polish representative. Vilnius was restored to Lithuania on Oct. 10, 1939. The Polish-
Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius prevented the formation of an effective bloc of eastern 
European countries between Germany and the Soviet Union. 
The Vilnius question was a more important issue to Lithuanian historiography 
than to Polish historiography. As a result, there is a heavier concentration of Lithuanian 
sources and scholarship on the subject. Along with heavy Lithuanian scholarship, also 
comes a heavy Lithuanian bias. The essays by Alfonsas Eidintas1 and Vytautas Zalys2, 
both Lithuanian, are the most complete and objective studies of Lithuanian history 
1 Alfonsas Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," and "The Nation Creates Its State" in Lithuania in 
European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918-1940, ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997). 
2 Zalys, "The Return of Lithuania To The European Stage," Ibid. 
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available, especially concerning Lithuania during the interwar period. Under Soviet rule, 
the work of Lithuanian historians at home had to pass through a severe filtering and 
molding process that limited what they could say. Lithuanian scholars in the Soviet 
Union were only permitted to study Lithuania in the narrow and contrived confines of the 
"Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic." As a result, distortions of scholarship occurred. 
Furthermore, emigre and foreign historians did not have the documentary materials to 
produce quality analytical work. The works by Eidintas and Zalys established the new 
benchmark for Lithuanian historiography. Equally valuable are the monographs written 
by the American scholar, Alfred Erich Senn, whose father lived in interwar Lithuania. 
Senn's scholarship of modem Lithuanian history is well researched and he presents his 
arguments in a clear and unbiased manner. 
Early History 
The Lithuanian people lived in relative obscurity along the Baltic coast for 
centuries, attracting little attention from other European countries. As one of Europe's 
last pagan outposts, Lithuania came under heavy attack from the hostile Teutonic knights 
in the thirteenth century. Abandoning its loose communal system for a monarchical form 
of government, Lithuania became aggressive and powerful, spreading its conquests 
throughout Eastern Europe, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. In the early 
fourteenth century the Grand Duke Gediminas founded the city of Vilnius (Vilna in 
Russian, Wilno in Polish) to serve as the royal capital. Establishing their nation as one of 
the wealthiest and most powerful in Europe, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania ruled an 
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enormous territory in which only approximately one-tenth of the people were Lithuanian 
of origin.3 
Union with Poland 
The roots of the Vilnius question are found in the evolution of Polish-Lithuanian 
relations since the fourteenth century. In 1386 Janiello (Jogaila), the Grand Duke of 
Lithuania, married Jadwiga, young Queen of Poland. The dynastic union of the 
Lithuanian and Polish thrones resulted in the Christianization of the Lithuanian people in 
the Roman Catholic rite and the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. Initially, the 
political union between Poland and Lithuania was an artificial creation, aimed at 
checking the German advance into the Baltic.4 The union of Lithuania and Poland 
remained a loose alliance by virtue of a common ruler until the Lublin General Union Act 
of 1569. 
On July 1, 1569, a common Polish-Lithuanian parliament meeting in Lublin 
transformed the loose personal union of the two states into a Commonwealth of Two 
Peoples. The Lublin General Union Act of 1569 federated the Lithuanian-Polish union 
into a single Commonwealth.5 (See Map 1.) According to its provisions, Lithuania was to 
retain its own territory, separate government officials and administrative apparatus, its 
own standing army, legal systems and laws, treasury, and schools. In common with 
Poland were to be the sovereign, elected jointly and crowned in Cracow, the Sejm and the 
Senate, and the two countries' foreign policies. 
3 W.J. Brockelbank, "The Vilna Dispute," American Journal of International Law 20 (July 1926), 
483. 
4 James A. Michener, Poland (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983), 61. 
5 Kazimieras Grauzinis, "Lithuania's Conflict with Poland over the Territories of Vilnius and 
Suvalkai," in Eastern Lithuania: A Collection of Historical and Ethnographical Studies, ed. Algirdas M. 
Budreckis, trans. the Lithuanian Association of the Vilnius Region (Chicago: Lithuanian Association of the 
Vilnius Region, 1985), 476. 
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Over time the two peoples became unified into one. Within the two countries, 
Polish language and culture came to dominate. The Lithuanian language, which loosely 
resembled Sanskrit, was hard to understand and seldom used in writing. In contrast, the 
Polish language was a Slavic tongue more easily understood by the surrounding nations 
and was more conducive for printing. Little by little, the Polish language came to be the 
language used in government, academia, and religion. Educated Lithuanians were forced 
to use Polish as the language of culture. As a result, the Lithuanian language slowly 
became relegated to the unwritten jargon of an oppressed peasantry who knew little of the 
world beyond their village. 6 This point is illustrated by the examples of Tadeusz 
Kosciuszko, the Polish national hero, and Adam Mickiewicz, the great Polish poet, who 
were both born in Lithuania, but were assimilated into Polish culture. Poland's cultural 
assimilation of Lithuania was gradual and actually increased the harmony among the two 
peoples.7 The harmony was further supported by a common religion, Roman Catholicism. 
Religion was such an integral part of the lives of both peoples that it was common for 
peasants to confuse their nationality with their religion. When asked their nationality, 
peasants would often reply "Catholic."8 Four centuries of a common political life and a 
common religion generated a community of common interests among the Poles and 
Lithuanians. 
Russian Rule 
During the 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth declined as a 
political power. Attempts at reform triggered foreign intervention from Prussia, Austria-
6 Alfred Erich Senn, "Introduction," in Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First 
Republic, 1918-1940, 3. 
7 Brockelbank, 484. 
8 Ibid. 
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Hungary, and Russia. Following three partitions, the old state ceased to exist. During the 
first two partitions, in 1772 and 1793, Lithuania lost only lands inhabited by East Slavs. 
The third partition inl 795 resulted in a division of the land inhabited by ethnic 
Lithuanians. The bulk of it went to Russia. Upon acquiring this territory, Russia 
designated the four provinces of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno, and Sulwalki as "the 
Lithuanian Provinces." (See Map 2.) Despite Russian political control of Lithuania, 
"Polonization" continued through the school system and the Catholic Church. After both 
Poles and Lithuanians launched unsuccessful revolts in 1830-1831 and 1863 against 
Russian rule, the imperial Russian government tried to free the Lithuanian people from 
the perceived dangerous and seditious influence of the Polish intelligentsia.9 The passive 
Polonization of Lithuania was now replaced with a policy of active "Russification." This 
policy of eliminating the "Lithuanian identity" was especially harsh in Vilnius, where 
Governor-General Nikolai Muraviev administered it. Vilnius University, the only 
institution of higher learning in Lithuania, was closed; use of Russian language in schools 
and government was mandated; and Russian law replaced the Statute of Lithuania, the 
code oflaw for Lithuania's nobles that had been in force since 1529. 
It was during this time period that that first substantial statistics on the ethnic 
composition of the Lithuania were compiled. These numbers were taken from parish 
censuses conducted during the 1850s. The first person to make use of such parochial 
statistics and apply them to the Vilnius province was Mikhail Lebedkin, who published 
the census figures for Lithuania in 1862.10 His findings are presented in Table 1: 
9 Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 12. 
10 Mikhail Ledkin, Vestnik lugozapadnoi Rosii, (Kiev, 1862) in Algirdas M. Budreckis, 
"Demographic Problems of Vilnius Province," in Eastern Lithuania: A Collection of Historical and 
Ethnographical Studies, 297. 
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Table 1: Ethnic Composition of the Vilnius Province in 1862 (according to Lebedkin) 
Lithuanians 418,880 49.98% 
Poles 154,386 18.42% 
Belarussians 146,432 17.42% 
Ukrainians 701 0.08% 
Great Russians 14,950 1.79% 
Krivichi 23,016 2.75% 
Jews 76,802 9.16% 
Germans 902 0.11% 
Tartars 2 416 0.29% 
Total: 838,485 100.00% 
According to Lebedkin's census, Lithuanians were over twice as numerous as the Poles 
in the Vilnius region. Unfortunately, Lebedkin-more accurately, the sources he 
utilized-did not explain the criteria for designating each ethnic group, which casts doubt 
upon the findings. One can only assume that the decisive factor was language. 11 
Lebedkin, himself, was a Great Russian, and there is no basis for thinking that he had any 
pro-Lithuanian tendencies. 
Roderik D'Erkert, a member of the Imperial Geographic Society of Russia, 
published an atlas in 1863 attempting to explain the expansion of the Polish nation.12 He 
relied upon figures from the 1858 census obtained by the Russian Statistical Committee 
and from information gathered by clergymen. His findings are presented in Table 2: 
Table 2: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province in 1863 (according to D'Erkert) 
Poles 212,000 24.75% 
Russians 178,000 20.78% 
Germans 900 00.11% 
Lithuanians 386,000 45.06% 
Jews 77,000 08.99% 
Others 2,800 00.33% 
Total Inhabitants 856,700 
I I Ibid., 299. 
12 Robert D'Erkert, Atlas Ethnographique de provinces habitees en totalite ou en partie par des 
polonais (St. Petersburg, 1863), in Budreckis, 300. 
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It is important to note that D'Erkert considered Belarussians and Ukrainians as Poles. 
According to his statistics, Lithuanians comprised 44.8% of the inhabitants of Vilnius. 
D'Erkert was himself a Polonized German, thus his figures for Lithuanians are likely to 
be minimized in favor of Poles. In comparing the ethnographic maps of Lebedkin and 
D'Erkert, both have approximately the same number and similar percentages. Moreover, 
they both agree that the Vilnius province had a Lithuanian majority and that the region 
was mainly a Lithuanian-speaking area. Since Polish Catholic priests and Russian 
Orthodox clergymen gathered the data that each scholar used, there is no evidence of the 
authors or the sources having pro-Lithuanian tendencies. 
In 1887, the Polish ethnographer Edward Czynski published a comprehensive 
study on the Poles and the Polish ethnographic area. 13 A Polish nationalist, the purpose of 
Czynski's work was to delineate Poland's ethnographic boundaries and to determine the 
members of the Polish nation. Czynski does not include the Vilnius region in Poland's 
ethnographic boundaries, rather, he considers Suvalki the easternmost "Polish town." His 
results are shown in Table 3: 
Table 3: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province in 1887 (according to Czynski) 
Lithuanians 417,200 35.0% 
Poles 281,312 23.6% 
Jews 176,416 14.8% 
Belarussians 239,592 20.1 % 
Others 77 480 6.5% 
Total 1,192,000 100.0% 
He found that 44 percent of the population of the city of Vilnius was Polish in 1880. This 
number is unreliably high because he labeled all Roman Catholics as Poles. Despite this 
13 Edward Czynski, Ethnograficzno-statystyczny zarys liczebnosci I rozsiedlenia ludnosci polskiej 
(Wisla, 1887), in Budreckis, 304. 
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bias, however, he did point out that Lithuanians constituted the plurality in the Vilnius 
province. 
In 1897 the Russian Tsar conducted the First General Census of the Russian 
Empire.14 This census tabulated the results not only by province, but by county as well. 
(See Map 3.) This census was more-or-less-scientific, using native tongue as the basis for 
nationality. The results of that census, indicating ethnic differentiation of the Vilnius 
province are shown in Table 4: 
Table 4: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province (according to Russian Census 1897) 
Lithuanians Poles Orthodox Old Believers Belarussian Jews Others 
Vilnius 76,916 25,293 7,524 3,670 82,527 15,377 1,474 
Vileika 133 4,492 118,972 524 60,138 16,962 607 
Dysna 699 4,562 106,118 9,161 59,074 13,088 702 
Lyda 17,700 8,298 50,025 44 100,319 19,522 436 
Asmena 8,757 3,556 70,304 510 116,561 24,373 ' 2,284 
Svencionys 57,869 9,080 16,522 7,472 65,484 9,128 760 
Trakai 118,161 21,990 8,198 2,010 29,179 18,664 1,959 
Total 276,226 77,274 377,663 23,391 513,282 117,124 8,240 
Serious doubts have been raised as to the objectivity of this report. Local Russian 
officials, who enthusiastically sought to show the central authorities that under their 
administration the "Russification" of the "Northwest Territory" was progressing, 
conducted the census.15 The census takers sought to list as many Russians and 
Belarussians as possible. 
The Tsarist government undertook a second census at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. This was the Police Statistical Inquiry of 1909.16 The results of this 
inquiry are given in Table 5: 
14 Pervaja vseobscaja perepis naselinenija Rossijskoj imperij, 1897 (St. Petersburg, 1904), in 
Budreckis, 306. 
15 Budreckis, 312. 
16 Pervaja vseobscaja perepis naselinenija Rossijskoj imperij, in Budreckis, 307. 
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Table 5: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province (according to Russian Census 1909) 
Lithuanians Poles Orthodox Old Believers Belarussian Jews Others 
Vilnius 16,283 107,887 7,311 3,758 55,623 38,392 8 
Vileika 66 6,057 105,448 696 69,119 15,484 248 
Dysna 1,036 3,838 121,602 12,735 85,091 16,500 365 
Lyda 4,238 12,461 48,812 127,282 18,528 518 
Asmena 12,154 3,538 72,325 390 136,279 21,557 951 
Svencionys 73,336 3,698 19,386 5,260 74,587 10,256 389 
Trakai 124,735 51,452 8,024 3,070 22,370 25,349 1,615 
Total 231,828 188,931 382,908 25,909 570,351 146,066 4,064 
Differences are noticeable between the 1897 and the 1909 tables. In just over twelve 
years, the overall population increased, but the number of Lithuanians decreased by about 
forty-five thousand. The number of Poles, however, more than doubled although there is 
no record of any mass migration of Poles to the Vilnius region at this time.17 Why? Did 
the Poles "Polonize" so many other people? 
Two major explanations can account for these numbers. First, the 1909 
questionnaire was issued without specific instructions. As a result, the data was collected 
haphazardly without any uniformity from district to district. 18 Secondly, political 
motivations existed for falsification. During the 1909 census, the police in many localities 
relied upon documents gathered by the Polish clergy. The pastors attempted to list all 
Catholics as Poles, not only to show their numerical ascendancy in order to gain more 
influence in the area, but also because of religious motives.19 Therefore, where 
intentionally or not, the pastors listed the people as Poles in order to protect Catholic 
locales from the encroachment by the Russian Orthodoxy. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the majority of non-Polish Catholics in many locales were listed as Poles. 
17 Budreckis, 310. 
18 lbid., 308. 
19 lbid., 311. 
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After centuries of gradual erosion of the Lithuanian language by the Poles and 
formal edicts outlawing Lithuanian by the Russians, Lithuanians began to value and 
develop their tongue.20 In 1883 the modem national movement began in Lithuania with 
the underground publication of the Auszra (The Dawn), the first Lithuanian newspaper in 
the Russian Empire. Other publications soon appeared, including books and magazines 
published by Lithuanians in America. The goals of this movement were to educate all 
illiterate Lithuanians to read and write in Lithuanian, increase appreciation of Lithuanian 
literature, and to organize the masses against future exploitation.21 The revival of 
Lithuanian culture and literature was met with stiff resistance. The clergy, mostly Polish, 
utilized its authority to persuade many Lithuanians, especially in the southeast, to use 
Polish as their religious and vernacular language. These efforts by the Catholic Church 
further blurred the line between language and national origin. 22 
By the late nineteenth century, the Lithuanian national movement was enlarging 
the scope of its efforts. Building upon the revival of the Lithuanian language, the 
movement was soon advocating the restoration of Lithuania as a separate country. At the 
heart of the movement was a nostalgia to rekindle the glorious history of the medieval 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania.23 Attempting to establish a clear connection with the past, 
activists made their headquarters in Vilnius, the ancient capital of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. A gathering of the region's leading professors, students, and civil servants 
formed the so-called Twelve Apostles' circle of Lithuanian intellectuals in 1895. The 
initial goal of this group was to restore a distinctly Lithuanian identity for the town. From 
20 Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 12. 
21 Brockelbank, 484. 
22 Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 13. 
23 Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 14. 
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this point onward, Vilnius would become the center for most Lithuanian nationalist 
activities and the heart of the Lithuanian nationalist movement. 
With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1905, active russification of the 
Lithuanians came to an end. The harsh restrictions imposed upon the Lithuanian language 
and press were revoked. During this period of relaxation by the Russians the Lithuanian 
national movement gained momentum. In November 1905, for the first time in modem 
Lithuanian history, representatives from all social groups met in Vilnius to shape the 
national movement. The Vilnius Diet, later referred to as the "Great Vilnius Assembly" 
of 1905, met to discuss grievances and formulate formal demands to present to the Tsar. 
The convention of over 2,000 delegates quickly went beyond its initial purpose and called 
for a restoration of an autonomous Lithuanian state within ethnic Lithuanian boundaries 
(the areas of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno and Suwalki), which would be governed by a 
democratically elected parliament in Vilnius.24 The resolutions of the Vilnius Diet were 
of extreme importance as they outlined the constitutional and international aims of 
Lithuanian nationalism and broadly defined the political evolution that Lithuania would 
follow along the path to statehood.25 The Russian Tsar formally denounced these 
resolutions. 
In 1907 the Russians reformed the process by which the Duma elected its 
representatives. Lithuanians, in a voting block with Jewish voters, managed to elect 
several representatives. All of Lithuania's electoral victories came in the provinces of 
Kaunas and Sulwalki, and that they failed to win any seats in Vilnius.26 As members of 
24 Alfred Erich Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959), 10. 
25 Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 18. 
26 Ibid. 
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the Duma, Lithuanian representatives worked tirelessly for Lithuanian national interests, 
pleading for autonomy. These efforts, however, were of little importance to the Russians 
with the prospect of World War looming on the horizon. 
World War I 
Although not a willing participant in World War I, Lithuania was hit hard by the 
Great War. (See Map 4.) The German army mobilized thousands of Lithuanians living in 
East Prussia (Lithuania Minor). Over half a million Lithuanians fought for the Allied 
cause in Russian, British, and American units (over the course of the war, 11, 700 
Lithuanians died fighting in the Russian Army alone.27) Situated on the strategic Russian-
German border, the Russian army hastily mobilized Lithuania for war. The Russian army 
not only confiscated horses and food from the Lithuanian peasants, but also deported 
those peoples considered unreliable, or sympathetic to the German cause, especially 
Jews, away from the Lithuanian front deep into Russia. On August 17, 1914, Russian 
General Pavel Rennenkampf led an offensive into East Prussia. The unexpectedly quick 
defeat of General Alksander Samsonov forced the Russians into a disorganized retreat. 
To hinder German advancement into Russia, Lithuanian peasants were ordered to bum 
their farms, abandon their crops, and head east into Russia. Approximately 500,000 
inhabitants were evacuated to the interior of Russia.28 The German forces poured into 
Lithuania, laying siege to and capturing the fortress of Kaunas in the spring of 1915 and 
occupying Vilnius on September 19, 1915. Upon entering Vilnius, the German 
commander Alexei Pfeil called Vilnius the "the prettiest pearl of the Polish kingdom." To 
27 Eidintas, "Restoration of the State,"18. 
28 Budreckis, 314. 
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the new conquerors, Vilnius appeared to be a Polish city.29 Its architecture was western 
European, showing Gothic, Baroque and classical influences. Poles controlled the city's 
previous local administration and religious services in the city's many Roman Catholic 
Churches were held in Polish. Lithuania was now under German military occupation. In 
1915 the German army created Ober Ost (Oberbefehlshaber Ost) to utilize Lithuania's 
resources to benefit the German army. 
The simultaneous movement of large groups of peoples across Lithuania's 
borders altered Lithuania's ethnic composition immeasurably.30 The mobilization efforts 
by the Russian Army, the removal of Lithuanian Jews, and the retreat of ethnic 
Lithuanians into Russia all shaped Lithuania's ethnic composition. Shortly after the 
Germans occupied the country, a special committee under Captain von Beckerath was 
ordered to determine the actual proportions of the various nationalities in Vilnius, in both 
the city and the province. On March 3, 1916, he reported that both Vilnius and Grodno 
provinces showed a large majority of Poles and Jews, against a small percentage of 
Lithuanians. His statistics are shown in Table 6:31 
Table 6: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province in 1916 (according to von Beckerath) 
Poles 70.0% 
Jews 
Lithuanians 
Belarussians 
Russians-Others 
23.9% 
3.5% 
2.6% 
How can we account for such a complete ethnic transformation in less than 10 years? The 
vast majority of German military police who aided von Beckerath to "interpret" 
29 Roman Debicki, Foreign Policy of Poland, 1919-39, with a foreword by Oscar Halecki (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 14. 
30 Alfred Erich Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question (Leiden, Netherlands: 
E. J. Brill, 1966), 7. 
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nationality were Poles from Silesia.32 Furthermore, in 1916 the German imperialists were 
considering the idea of a "Polish Kingdom" in order· to win over the Poles to their 
military efforts. The Vilnius region or "Russland [Russia] Poland" would have been an 
important addition to such a Polish kingdom.33 
During this period of reorganization, the Germans merged the Vilnius District and 
Lithuanian District (Kaunas) into "Militarverwaltung Litauen" in June 1916. As well as 
conscripting war resources from the Lithuanian population, the army also employed an 
active policy of "Germanization." The German military administration put a restriction 
on movement, mandated that German be used in all schools (closing those that did not 
comply), and closed all Lithuanian language newspapers except for the Dabartis (The 
Present), which was reduced to printing solely pro-German propaganda.34 
Independence 
The war also had a tremendous effect upon the Lithuanian national movement. 
Initially, Lithuania actively supported the Russian war effort. In the Russian Duma, 
Martynas Y cas, a deputy from Kaunas, pledged Lithuanian support in the defense of 
Russia against the attacking German army. In August 1914 Lithuanian leaders in Vilnius 
organized a Lithuanian Center, under the leadership of Antanas Smetona, with 
representatives from all the Lithuanian political groups except the Social Democrats. 
Once Vilnius fell to the Germans, contact with Y cas and other prominent Lithuanians in 
Russia was cut of£ A third center for Lithuanian nationalism was located in Lausanne, 
Switzerland, where Juozas Gabrys directed the "Lithuanian Information Bureau." Gabrys, 
314. 
31 Centralne Biuro Statystyczne, Rocznik statstyczny Wilna, 1921-28 (Vilnius, 1930), in Budreckis, 
32 Budreckis, 315. 
33 Ibid. 
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a Lithuanian emigre, had dealings with United States intelligence officers in Switzerland 
as well as the French Deuxieme Bureau. In 1916, a conference of Lithuanians met at 
Bern and demanded "absolute autonomy."35 Smetona, Y cas and Gabrys were all 
Lithuanian nationalists and were in close contact with one another. Their different 
environments, however, affected their respective views of Lithuania's future.36 
Rallying around the leadership of Antanas Smetona, the Lithuanian Center sought 
cooperation with the Germans. Having occupied Lithuania, the German government 
intended to annex it by either of two ways: Direct annexation, colonization, and 
Germanization of Lithuania; or the creation of a formally independent state that would be 
completely dependent on Germany. 37 This issue polarized the Kaiser William II, the chief 
military authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Reichstag centrists. The 
issue became further charged as the Lithuanians insisted upon independence for the 
historically ethnic Lithuanian lands of Vilnius, Kaunas, Suwalki, and Grodno. In August 
1917, the occupation administration granted permission to the Lithuanians to hold a 
conference, in cooperation with the German authorities, to discuss the future of 
Lithuania. The Vilnius Conference was held on September 18-22, 1917, with 222 
participants representing all of the major political parties and social groups. These were 
among the most active people in Lithuanian politics at this time. From the outset, the 
delegates displayed strong anti-German attitudes and firm determination for an 
independent Lithuania. The Conference elected a twenty-member council, the Council of 
Lithuania (Lietuvos Taryba), to act as the executive authority of the Lithuanian people. 
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The Taryba, in turn, chose Antanas Smetana as its chairman. In the following months, 
conferences of Lithuanians in Stockholm, Bern, Russia and the United States officially 
recognized the Taryba as representing the will of the Lithuanian people. 38 
In December 1917 a Lithuanian delegation was permitted to travel to Berlin to 
discuss the fate of Lithuanian. The Germans offered Lithuania autonomy from Russia, 
but Lithuania would then be required to enter into a particular type of federation with 
Germany, bound by conventions on military affairs, transportation, customs union and 
finance. Using a text prepared by the Germans, the Taryba tentatively approved the 
document with some minor changes on December 11, 1917. The resolution proclaimed 
the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania with Vilnius as the capital. 
Furthermore, Lithuania requested the protection and aid of the German Reich. and the 
Taryba declared itself to be "in favor of the Lithuanian State's firm and perpetual bond of 
alliance with Germany."39 
Upon its publication, Lithuanians were outraged with the agreement. While they 
applauded the severing of Lithuania's ties to Russia, they viewed the "permanent and 
firm alliance" with Germany as a retreat from the decisions of the Vilnius Conference.40 
Frustrated that Germany had yet to recognize the Declaration of December 11, the Taryba 
reconvened on February 16, 1918, and approved a new resolution.41 This second 
declaration of independence made no mention of ties to any foreign country. It boldly 
proclaimed Lithuania an independent, democratic state with its capital in Vilnius. All 
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existing political ties to foreign nations were abolished (including Germany, as well as 
Russia) and if future political ties with foreign powers were to be established, a 
democratically elected Constituent Assembly must first approve the terms. February 16 
was soon hailed as the national holiday of Lithuanian Independence. Angered by 
Lithuania's second declaration, Kaiser William II refused to recognize it. Rather, on 
March 23, 1918, he officially recognized Lithuania on the principles of the original 
declaration of independence from December 11, which emphasized close ties to 
Germany.42 
Rumors began to circulate of a German plan to incorporate Lithuania into a union 
with Saxony or Prussia. Fearing such an action, on July 13, 1918, the conservative wing 
of the Taryba, in an attempt to maintain Lithuania's independence, proposed the revival 
of a monarchy. They extended an invitation to Duke Wilhelm von Urach, Count of 
Wurtemberg, to rule as King of Lithuania.43 Urach, who was notoriously favorable to 
Lithuanian independence, accepted the throne and adopted the name Mindaugas II. Since 
this invitation was not agreed upon by a democratically elected Constituent Assembly, as 
was stipulated in the February 16 declaration, a newly elected Taryba condemned this 
move as illegal and annulled it on November 2, 1918.44 
Post World War I 
The Armistice of 1918 brought no peace to Eastern Europe, as war would 
continue into 1920. Allied victory, the German revolution and the Bolshevik advance all 
followed with lightning rapidity. Lithuania was a country in crisis. In an attempt to 
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establish stability, the Taryba invited Augustinas Voldemaras to become Prime Minister 
on November 5, 1918.45 A brilliant scholar, Voldemaras had been Docent of History from 
the University of St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, his tendency to antagonize people, along 
with his egoism and his quick temper, handicapped his political career. Voldemaras 
inherited an economically devastated country that lacked any fixed boundaries, and was 
plagued by rogue bands of demoralized German military units that pillaged the 
countryside. Since the government had no system of local administration, was unable to 
collect taxes, or even organize an effective police force, it lacked real power to alleviate 
any of the country's problems.46 Furthermore, any efforts to address these problems were 
constantly being challenged by local Poles who were actively trying to form a Lithuanian 
union with Poland. While the Lithuanian government was trying to bring stability to the 
domestic situation, hostile neighbors forced Lithuania to fight a continuous series of wars 
to maintain its independence. 
On November 13, 1918, the Soviet Russian government annulled the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, by which it had surrendered any claims to Lithuania, and the Red Army 
began to push west.47 Joseph Stalin, Commissar of Nationalities of the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), envisioned Lithuania as part of the Soviet 
union. To reassert Russian control in the region, he ordered Lithuanian Bolsheviks to 
form a communist government and proclaim Lithuania a Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Vincas Kapsukas and Zigmas Aleksa-Angarietis proceeded to Lithuania to oversee the 
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process. On December 8, 1918, the self-proclaimed provisional Lithuanian Revolutionary 
Government, headed by Kapsukas, was established. And on December 16, 1918, the 
Soviet (Bolshevik) regime in Lithuania was officially proclaimed by manifesto.48 The 
plan was for the Lithuanian Soviet government to then greet the Red Army as its own and 
not an occupational force. With the Bolsheviks in place, the Red Army invaded 
Lithuania. 
Grasping the urgency of the situation, the first task of the Voldemaras government 
was to organize an effective defense against the Bolshevik advance. On November 23, 
1918, the government ordered the creation of a Lithuanian army, mobilizing Lithuanian 
soldiers returning from Russia. 49 Lithuanian peoples throughout the countryside rallied to 
defend their homeland. Approximately 12,000 Lithuanian volunteers would enlist in the 
army between 1918 and 1920, of which approximately 1,444 soldiers, militiamen, and 
guerillas would die.50 As volunteers gathered in Bolshevik-free parts of the country, the 
biggest problem was equipping the army. To overcome this lack of arms, the Lithuanian 
government was able to purchase limited amounts of supplies from the German army. On 
December 20, with the Bolshevik Army nearing the outskirts of Vilnius, Smetona and 
Voldemaras departed to Germany to seek financial assistance. The leadership of 
Lithuania and its defenses fell to Mykolas Slezevicius, who encouraged all Lithuanians to 
resist the invading Soviet units. With the Red Army drawing ever closer, the Lithuanian 
Government was obliged to withdraw to Kaunas, from where the defense of the country 
against the Bolsheviks was directed. Russian units subsequently occupied Vilnius on 
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January 5, 1919. The Lithuanians were able to work with several German units that 
remained in western Lithuania on instructions from the Great Powers, who were 
concerned about a possible Bolshevik advance into East Prussia, to halt their retreat line 
at Kaunas. This allowed Lithuania to reorganize their military units. Meanwhile, the Red 
Army overran most of eastern Lithuania, penetrating as deep into Lithuania as Siauliai in 
the north, but was eventually stopped by German troops stationed in Latvia. (Map 5.) 
Having occupied Vilnius, the Red Army installed a communist Lithuanian 
government and renamed the region the Lithuanian-Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic 
in February 1919.51 This move proved extremely unpopular among the Lithuanian 
populace for several reasons. The Bolsheviks declared a progressive policy of designating 
five official languages: Lithuanian, Polish, Belarussian, Yiddish, and Russian. Since few 
people spoke all of these languages, only Russian was used. This indirect attempt at 
"Russification" angered most Lithuanians and quashed any support for the Bolshevik 
cause. 52 Furthermore, the Red Army was very poorly supplied and was forced to live off 
the land. They conscripted food, clothing and livestock, which the Lithuanians viewed as 
robbery. These harsh policies of the Russian invading Army drove many peasants to 
enlist in the Lithuanian army. 
The Russian Red Army, fighting on foreign soil, did not prove to be as spirited as 
the Lithuanian army, which was fighting to defend its homeland. Despite early setbacks, 
the Lithuanian army received a boost in March when Colonel Warwick Greene and 
fourteen United States army officers visited Lithuania.53 Colonel Greene brought much 
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needed military and medical supplies along with him. Furthermore, many Lithuanians 
considered this visit as the possible beginning of diplomatic relations with the Great 
Powers. The visits of Colonel Constantin Reboul, who led joint French and British 
troops, and of unofficial diplomat Herbert Grant Watson to Kaunas, also raised spirits 
and helped the Lithuanian army reorganize.54 By April 1919, nearly 6,000 armed 
Lithuanian soldiers began to repulse the seemingly invincible Red Army, pushing it all 
the way back to Vilnius. 55 On the eve of the recapture of Vilnius from the Bolsheviks, the 
national army of Lithuanian was forestalled by the Polish army, which was advancing 
from the southeast and occupied the city. The Poles justified their move into Lithuania 
not just as an anti-Bolshevik action, but also on the basis of self-determination of local 
Poles. Thus, by April 19, 1919, Vilnius was under Polish control. The Lithuanian 
government wishing to avoid an armed conflict with Poland addressed itself to the Allied 
Powers with a protest against this Polish action. Despite this setback, the Lithuanian 
Army continued to pursue the Russians and by late August 1919, the Red Army was 
expelled from its last Lithuanian holding, the city of Zarasai. Realizing their rapidly 
diminishing position, on September 11, 1919, the government of the Russian S.F.S.R 
offered to negotiate for peace with Lithuania. These talks would not open until early 
1920. More good news came on September 26, 1919, when Great Britain awarded de 
facto recognition to Lithuania.56 
While Lithuania viewed the Bolshevik Red Army as the primary threat to its 
independence, there was still the problem of German troops in the area. German troops 
were slow to withdraw from Lithuania, as the Armistice of November 1918 obligated 
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German troops to remain on the territory of the former Russian Empire, until further 
Allied instruction.57 As Germany's Western Front collapsed, this problem was further 
complicated as volunteers from Germany joined Russian refugees to form new military 
units in the struggle against Bolshevik Russia. General Rudiger von der Goltz was given 
command of all German units in the area. During the summer of 1919, a splinter group of 
Goltz's forces, led by Pavel Bermondt-Avalov, moved south into Lithuania from Latvia. 
Lithuanians viewed Bermondt's efforts as a German attempt to maintain a foothold in the 
Baltic. While the Lithuanian national army was already facing the Bolsheviks and the 
Poles on numerous fronts in the south, Bermondt overran the Siauliai region in the north. 
When Lithuania received assurances that Poland would not attack its rear in October 
1919, they proceeded to move its Army north and directly engaged Bermondt. The Allied 
powers had expressed similar concerns that the German forces were no longer fighting 
Bolsheviks and had demanded a swift German withdrawal. 58 An allied military mission, 
headed by a Frenchman, General Henri Albert Niessel, supervised the evacuation of the 
Bennondtists from Northern Lithuania. 59 Fighting alongside Allied forces, Lithuania 
reclaimed the city of Radviliskis on November 21-22 1919, which forced a rapid 
evacuation of Bermondtist units. By mid-December the last Bermondtist troops, pursued 
by Lithuanian forces, evacuated Lithuanian territory. 
As difficult as it was for Lithuania to defend its independence on the battlefield, it 
was equally difficult for it to defend its independence in the eyes of the world. At the 
Paris Peace Conference, the Lithuanian delegation, led by Augustinas Voldemaras, was 
56 Ibid., 37. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 38. 
59 Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, 188. 
25 
denied its request for official status. This setback did not change Lithuanian goals for the 
Conference; it still demanded international diplomatic recognition, a clear demarcation of 
its frontiers, and assistance in rebuilding their war-ravaged economy. 60 Of particular 
urgency were their frontiers, as Lithuania's territorial aspirations directly collided with 
German and Polish interests. The Lithuanian delegation first had to determine on exactly 
what foundations-historical or ethnological-the restoration of Lithuania would be 
accomplished. They soon rejected the historical concept of Lithuania, that is, the 
grandiose concept of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and opted for the principle of a 
national state, that is, a state founded on a union of ethnologic areas. Unfortunately, this 
concept of ethnologic Lithuania was rather nebulous. Since Lithuania does not have any 
natural national frontiers, such as mountains, rivers, swamps, or deserts, it is difficult to 
establish ethnic boundaries. Generally speaking, ethnologic Lithuania had to encompass 
the former Russian provinces of Vilnius, Kaunas, Suwalki, and Grodno. Furthermore, but 
less fervently, the Lithuania delegation hoped to annex Lithuania Minor (northern East 
Prussia) and reunite that region's large Lithuanian population with Lithuania proper, 
which angered Germany. Also, both Lithuania and Poland claimed the city of Vilnius and 
the surrounding region. On March 24, 1919, Voldemaras formally demanded recognition 
of an ethnologic Lithuania, based on the above territories, as well as parts of the province 
of Courland, totaling 125,000 square kilometers of territory and a population of 
approximately six million.61 (Map 6.) 
Although the Great Powers denied Voldemaras' demand and never specifically 
mentioned a "Lithuanian state, "the Versailles treaty did contain several articles that 
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directly affected Lithuanian territory.62 In Article 433, the provisional government of 
Lithuania was considered an already "existing" but not yet an "established" government. 
Article 87 postponed the demarcation of Poland's eastern frontiers. Articles 28 and 99 
both provided for the detachment of territory of Klaipeda (Memelland) from Germany. 
Article 116 officially annulled the Russian-German agreements at Brest-Litovsk. Article 
117 obliged Germany to respect all future treaties that the Allied powers might conclude 
with the successor states of the Russian Empire. Also several articles internationalized 
the Nemunas (Neiman) River. Although the Lithuanian delegation left the Peace 
Conference disappointed that it had failed to win international recognition, it could take 
solace in the fact it had used the opportunity to make the world aware of its existence. 
Lithuanian Wars of Independence 
Specifically, Lithuania wanted to make the world aware of the Polish occupation 
of Vilnius, which they viewed as a Lithuanian city. In contrast, Poland objected to 
Lithuania's claim to the region, asserted that the majority of inhabitants were Polish-
speaking. The two sides both claimed what has subsequently become known as the 
Vilnius territory, the region that has traditionally formed the eastern part of Lithuania, of 
which the city of Vilnius is only a small part. The Vilnius region contained an ethnically 
diverse population. Any data concerning the region from the late nineteenth century was 
unreliable and contradictory. For example, the Russian census of 1897 reported the 
population of Vilnius and its surrounding territory to have a Belarussian majority (56 
percent) and a small Polish minority (8 percent.)63 In 1919, the Poles conducted their own 
census of the approximately the same region and recorded the contrary, a dominant 
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Polish majority (53 percent) and a small Belarussian minority (7 percent.)64 Each census 
of the Vilnius region during this time period reflected the biases of the census takers. It 
has been estimated that approximately 30 percent of the region's population, who were 
alternatively classified as Poles or Belarussians, lacked a clear national consciousness. 65 
The Lithuanians, basing their claims that the Vilnius region had been populated in ancient 
times by Lithuanian tribes also claimed this group. 66 In fact, until both Poland and 
Lithuania disputed the ownership of the region in the early twentieth century, no one had 
ever questioned that Vilnius had always been the ancient capital of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. This was the only way Lithuanians had ever viewed Vilnius, as their capital. 
To the Lithuanians, not only was territory at stake, but more importantly, the fate of their 
capital city. The problem was that over the centuries, the Lithuanian language and culture 
had eroded away within the region. Lithuanian censuses could never claim more than 17 
percent ofregion's population during the early twentieth century.67 
With Poland and Lithuania unable to reach an agreement concerning rightful 
ownership of the Vilnius region, the Lithuanian government asked the Allied Supreme 
Council to fix a line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian military forces.68 As 
the regional Lithuanian-Polish dispute became an issue of international concern, 
Lithuania was at a clear disadvantage for two major reasons. First, Lithuania's 
independence had yet to be officially recognized by the Western powers. Sharply 
contrasting interpretations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Lithuania's unsettled 
63 Vytautas Zalys, ''Notes," in Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 
1918-1940, 220. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 220-221. 
66 Ibid., 221. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Senn, The Emergence of Modem Lithuania, 131. 
28 
frontiers and a weak central government all served as major obstacles to Lithuania's 
recognition. 69 France was actively supporting a large and strong Poland, which it hoped 
would serve as the dominant power in Eastern Europe. The first such line was set by the 
Western powers on June 18, 1919, and was subsequently violated by Polish forces. 70 A 
second line was drawn, the so-called "Marshal Foch" line, on July 27, 1919.71 The line 
accurately reflected the military situation on the ground, and thus assigned to the 
superior, occupying Polish forces large amounts of ethnically Lithuanian territory, 
including the Vilnius region. On December 8, 1919 the Supreme Council reassessed the 
situation and fixed a provisional eastern boundary of Poland on ethnic grounds, 
reassigning the Vilnius and Grodno regions to Lithuania, establishing the so-called 
"Curzon line."72 (See Map 7.) The Poles found this move to be unaccept~ble and 
proceeded to launch a military campaign against Soviet Russia in April 1920, in the hope 
of establishing their sovereignty over the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After 
initial Polish success, the Red Army turned the tide and began to repulse the Polish 
forces, threatening the very existence of the Polish state. These developments alarmed the 
Great Powers, specifically Great Britain, who feared that the German Army might invade 
Poland to defend German frontiers from the Red Army.73 In early July, the Great Powers 
met at Spa to save Poland. 
The Conference in Spa, July 9-10, 1920, recommended to Poland that it must 
withdraw behind the Curzon line, and the Red Army must remain 50 kilometers east of 
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that frontier.74 In tum, the Lithuanians would take control of the Vilnius region. 
Furthermore, the Great Powers would settle any future disputes in the region. Polish 
Prime Minister Wladyslaw Grabski agreed to negotiate all the proposals, but refused the 
transfer of Vilnius to Lithuania. British Prime Minister Lloyd George made it quite clear 
that Vilnius was too far from Poland's ethnographic frontier, and that the Great Powers 
viewed the Vilnius dispute as a matter for the Lithuanians and the Russians to settle, not 
the Poles.75 The Great Powers presented Poland with an ultimatum: either agree to all 
their proposals and the status of Vilnius would be finally settled by the Allied Supreme 
Council; or, the issue would be settled between Lithuania and Russia. The Poles 
reluctantly agreed, but the ever-changing situation on the ground and the Russian 
diplomatic overtures to the Lithuanians would make it a moot point. 
Concurrently as the Great Powers and Poland were negotiating at Spa, Soviet 
Russia and Lithuania were concluding their own conference in Moscow. Although the 
Western powers refused to recognize Lenin's regime, the formal negotiations between the 
Lithuanians and Soviet Russia solidified Lithuania's claim to legitimacy, which was 
important considering the failure of the Lithuanian delegation to win anything substantial 
in Paris.76 The Lithuanian delegation, headed by Thomas Narusevicius, demanded 
recognition of continuity with the old Grand Duchy of Lithuania and asked for formal 
recognition of Lithuania by a separate document, not as part of a general peace treaty. 
The Soviet delegation headed by Adolf Joffe, however, viewed Lithuania as a new 
political unit. The Russians won out and, according to Treaty of Moscow, Russia 
unequivocally recognized the independence and sovereignty of Lithuania and renounced 
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all historical claims to the region.77 This recognition was based not on any historical 
continuity of the Lithuanian state, but on the principle of national self-determination, 
which was a much weaker basis ofrecognition.78 
The bulk of negotiating focused upon territorial issues. The Russians agreed to the 
Lithuanian demand that ethnic boundaries serve as the basis of Lithuania's frontiers. The 
treaty clearly defined the borders between Lithuania and Russia, with Russia recognizing 
the sovereignty of Lithuania over the former Russian provinces of Vilnius, Kaunas, 
Sulwalki, Grodno, Augustow and Lida, which both sides considered to have an ethnically 
Lithuanian population. (See Map 8.) The territory given to Lithuania by Russia, however, 
overlapped the "Curzon Line" drawn by Supreme Council on December 2, 1919, and 
awarded territory to Lithuania that was under Polish control. In exchange for having most 
of its territorial demands satisfied, Lithuania had to agree that the entry of Soviet forces 
into Lithuanian territory in the event of Russian conflict with Poland would not be 
considered a violation of the treaty or an "unfriendly act" toward Lithuania. The treaty 
was contingent on Lithuania remaining neutral in the context of the Russo-Polish war. 
The Treaty of Moscow was signed on July 12, 1920. 
The following day, July 13, 1920, Poland agreed to transfer control of Vilnius to 
the Lithuanians, based upon the Spa agreements. British and French mediators were on 
hand in Vilnius to oversee the transfer of the city's control from Poland to Lithuania, as 
well as to ensure that the Bolsheviks did not take control. 79 The Polish, however, delayed 
their withdrawal from Vilnius, which prevented Lithuanian troops from entering the city 
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as the Red Army advanced from the east. As a result, the Bolsheviks were the first to 
enter Vilnius on July 14, and occupied the city. In spite of the newly signed Lithuanian-
Soviet peace treaty, it appeared that the Soviets had no intention of returning Vilnius to 
the Lithuanians.80 The Soviets then pushed westward and advanced to Warsaw. 
At the gates of Warsaw, the tide of the Russo-Polish war turned yet again, and the 
Red Army was dealt a crushing defeat. On August 6, 1920, the Soviets signed over 
Vilnius to the Lithuanians, which the Lithuanian national army occupied on August 26. 81 
The following day, the last Russians withdrew from Lithuanian territory. The Soviets had 
been compelled to abandon Vilnius not on the basis of any treaty obligations, but in the 
course of retreat after the Battle of Warsaw.82 As the Red Army hastily retreated back 
towards the Russia, the Polish forces were in close pursuit and came upon territory 
occupied by Lithuanian troops, where some fighting occurred. The Poles complained to 
the Allies about the passage of Russian troops through Lithuania, specifically the 
transport of Soviet prisoners-of-war, as well as an alleged secret Russian-Lithuanian 
military pact. Although the Red Army's passage through Lithuania did little to affect the 
military situation, it did weaken Lithuania's international position. British and French 
diplomats were immediately sent to investigate Lithuania's declared neutrality. Their 
investigation reported no evidence of a Russian-Lithuanian military alliance, but they did 
confirm that Soviet prisoners-of-war were being transported across Lithuania. Enraged, 
the Poles used this as an excuse to invade Lithuania. 83 
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In late August, Lithuanian and Polish military advisors met for talks in Kaunas. 84 
Poland made the same demands that the Soviets made in July, free passage for their 
troops in the Vilnius and Grodno regions and control of the Grodno-Lida-Molodechno 
railroad. If agreed to, this demand would violate Lithuanian neutrality, which would force 
Russia to renounce the Treaty of Moscow. The Lithuanians, as in their talks with the 
Soviets, demanded respect for their frontiers. As the talks progressed, Polish forces 
pushed deeper into Lithuania and occupied the regions of Augustow, Seiny and Suwalki, 
which led to further clashes with Lithuanian troops. Poland viewed Lithuania's resistance 
as an alliance with Russia. 85 On this basis, the Polish forces proceeded to attack 
Lithuanian forces on a wider front. 
When the talks at Kaunas stalled, the Polish foreign minister, Prince Eustachy 
Sapieha, telegraphed the League of Nations to complain about the Lithuanian military 
concessions to Russia and pleaded for international intervention to end the bloodshed. 86 
Similarly, the Lithuanians appealed to Great Britain to help resolve the Polish-Lithuanian 
differences. The British advised Lithuania to accept the League's mediation. On 
September 16, 1920, the case was formally submitted to the League of Nations in Paris 
for arbitration, with Ignance Jan Paderewski presenting the Polish arguments, and 
Voldemaras, presenting the Lithuanian perspective. 87 After lengthy discussion, Paul 
Hymans of Belgium submitted a resolution that both governments tentatively accepted. 
The resolution essentially called for both governments to honor the "Curzon Line" and 
that an international commission, appointed by the Council, would oversee that both 
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governments abided by it. On October 4, 1920, the international commission composed 
of Colonel Chardigny of France, Major Herse of Spain, Major Keenan of Great Britain, 
Captain Yanamaki of Japan, and Colonel Vegera of Italy arrived in Vilnius.88 Despite the 
tentative agreement reached in ~aris, fighting intensified along the disputed areas 
between Lithuanian and Polish forces. 
The Poles and Lithuanians also attempted direct negotiations, meeting at Suwalki 
on September 30, 1920. 89 Both sides agreed to cease hostilities and seek peaceful 
resolutions to their disputes. Throughout the negotiations, neither side directly mentioned 
the city of Vilnius, although it was the main point of the discussions.90 Both sides agreed, 
once again, to accept the Curzon Line, but only as far as the city of Bastunai, about 40 
miles south of Vilnius, awarding Vilnius to the Lithuanians.91 The security of the city was 
far from guaranteed, however, because the line of demarcation did not extend past 
Bastunai, Polish forces could skirt the line without actually violating it. Both sides also 
agreed to a mutual exchange of prisoners. The Treaty of Sulwalki was signed on October 
7, 1920. 
The Zeligowski Coup 
On October 5, 1920 Poland and the Soviet Union had reached a provisional 
agreement for a cease-fire and the preliminary conditions for peace, which gave Poland a 
free hand in respect to Lithuania.92 The Polish National Democratic Party favored openly 
attacking Lithuania and occupying as much of its territory as possible, especially Vilnius. 
Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski, however, chose a more subtle way of obtaining the same 
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result; he ordered one of his generals to "mutiny" and seize Vilnius. On the same day the 
Sulwalki agreement was signed, the Polish General Lucian Zeligowski attacked 
Lithuanian troops at Orany. Two days later on October 9, 1920, the day before the 
Sulwalki agreement was to take effect, Zeligowski invaded Vilnius. General Zeligowski's 
raid was actually anticipated by the British forces in the region.93 British observers were 
initially deceived by the misinformation emanating from Polish sources and believed that 
this was a "mutinous" action not sanctioned by the Polish government. 94 Zeligowski 
triumphantly proclaimed Vilnius and the surrounding territory "The Republic of Central 
Lithuania" and furthermore declared himself head of state. Although the Polish 
government continually denied their connection with Zeligowski, it kept Zeligowski well 
supplied with Polish troops and weapons.95 Not surprisingly, the local Poles in Vilnius, 
who had no desire to join Lithuania, welcomed Zeligowski as a national hero. In contrast, 
the Jews in Vilnius, who were constantly harassed by Polish forces, fled Vilnius as 
refugees to Kaunas. Zeligowski declared his objective to be the "Marshal Foch" line of 
demarcation of 1919, but he did not rule out an attack on Kaunas. This prospect was 
intended to force the Lithuanian government to accept Zeligowski's demand for 
negotiations.96 Not only did Lithuania lose its capital to a foreign army, but also with 
their troops deployed in the Southwest, the heartland of Lithuania was open to further 
Polish advance from the east. In desperation, the Lithuanian government expressed a 
willingness to negotiate with Zeligowski. Realizing the implications of such an action, it 
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quickly retracted the offer, not wanting to "legitimize'' Zeligowski's actions. Although 
the Allied powers disapproved of Zeligowski's coup de force, they lacked the means and 
the will to intervene and restrain Poland and they passed the issue on to the League of 
Nations.97 In an official declaration of October 11 to the Allied Powers, the Polish 
government asserted that the territory seized by Zeligowski was now part of Poland. 
At the next meeting of the Council in Brussels on October 26, 1920, Lithuania 
appealed that Poland's actions violated Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Treaty of Versailles; 
specifically that Poland, as a member of the League of Nations, had "resorted to war in 
disregard of its convenants."98 The head of the Polish delegation to the League, declared 
that Zeligowski had acted on his own, but that his action had the approval of the entire 
Polish nation.99 On one hand, the League of Nations refused to legitimate Zeligowski's 
actions. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the provisional Polish-Soviet peace, the 
League considered the situation in Eastern Europe to have "changed."100 M. Leon 
Bourgeois of Prance, who was mediating the discussion, saw no alternative but to declare 
that the territorial dispute between Poland and Lithuania over the Vilnius region should 
be decided by a plebiscite. The League subsequently ordered an official Plebiscite 
Commission to determine what territory was to be included in plebiscite, to prepare the 
regulations, and to supervise the administration of the plebiscite. The inability of the 
League of Nations to negate the consequences of Zeligowski's actions demonstrated the 
impotence of the League in resolving international disputes. 101 Although neither Poland 
nor Lithuania favored a plebiscite, both formally agreed to one. The largest obstacle to 
96 Zalys, 75. 
97 Ibid, 76. 
98 Quoted in Brockelbank, 487. 
99 Quoted in Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 61. 
36 
overcome during the talks for the plebiscite was the military occupation of the Vilnius 
region, where General Zeligowski and his troops were still stationed.102 How could the 
Allies disarm them so as to allow a free expression of opinion? Furthermore, both sides 
disagreed on the actual boundaries of the territories to be included in the plebiscite. 
As the talks continued in early November, General Zeligowski launched a 
surprise offensive with the objective of reaching the line held by Poland at the end of 
June 1920, which extended well beyond the city limits of Vilnius to encompass the entire 
Vilnius region. Once again, the prospect of a Polish occupation of Kaunas reappeared. By 
mid-November the Lithuanian army managed to regroup and halt Zeligowski's advance 
at the cities of Sirvintos and Giedraiciai. The Lithuanian national army proceeded to push 
Zeligowski's forces back to Vilnius. Although most of their diplomatic efforts to gain 
control of Vilnius had failed, the possibility now existed of occupying it militarily. 
Despite the opportunity to do so, the Lithuanian government deferred to the League of 
Nations Military Commission under French Colonel Chardigny, which ordered all 
hostilities to cease immediately. In hindsight, this would be viewed as Lithuania's last 
real opportunity to retake Vilnius. 103 
The League's Military Commission called for cease-fire talks to be held in 
Kaunas. On November 29, 1920, an armistice was signed by the Lithuanian and Polish 
governments, which established a neutral zone between the opposing forces. 104 During 
the negotiations, Poland refused to recognize Lithuania's borders set by the Treaty of 
Moscow, or to have Zeligowski's troops withdraw from Vilnius. These plebiscite 
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negotiations caused great concern for the Soviets. According to the terms of the proposed 
plebiscite, Zeligowski's troops were to be replaced by a League force of over 1,500 
troops. Moscow made it clear to the Lithuanians that it would consider such a dispatch of 
international forces to the region a threat to Russia's security and a breach of Lithuania's 
declared neutrality and, thus, a violation of the Moscow Treaty. Soviet Russia went as far 
as to threaten direct intervention. The talks reached a deadlock, as neither side wanted a 
plebiscite. Lithuania feared an unfavorable result and Poland saw no need to change the 
status quo. On December 31, 1920, the two governments informed the Plebiscite 
Commission that they regarded an agreement among themselves as impossible. 105 
In light of the many difficulties, the Council asked both Polish and Lithuanian 
governments if it could rely on their support in the task of carrying out the plebiscite. In a 
letter to the League on Nations on January 21, 1921, Lithuania replied that it would allow 
a plebiscite only on specific terms.106 First and foremost, they demanded a complete 
withdraw of Polish troops from the territory in question, including Zeligowski's units. 
The plebiscite must be administered by states not directly involved in the dispute. 
Lithuania needed a guarantee that another coup de force of General Zeligowski would not 
take place. A delay must take place before the plebiscite was administered to allow Polish 
propaganda to subside. The League of Nations must grant de jure recognition of 
Lithuania, which Poland already had. Finally, Lithuania also stressed the fear of Soviet 
interference in the region. In view of this attitude as well as the many difficulties arising 
from the presence of General Zeligowski in the region, the League decided to change its 
tactics. On March 31, 1921, both nations agreed to negotiate all territorial, economic and 
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military issues under the arbitration of Paul Hymans, the Belgian Foreign Minister. (See 
Map 9.) 
Intervention of the Great Powers: The Hymans Plan 
As the conference approached, the Great Powers believed the only solution to the 
Lithuanian-Polish dispute was a federation between the two states. 107 Warsaw welcomed 
this arrangement, but for Lithuania, whose sole aim was their own nation-state and who 
viewed the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a negative light, this proposed 
federation was unacceptable. The Lithuanians, however, had no alternative to offer. In 
Poland, there were three main views on the future of Lithuania. Pilsudski advanced the 
idea of reviving the historic "Lithuania" with Vilnius as the capital, but federally linked 
to Poland. Alternatively, some favored a separate, but small Lithuania centered on 
Kaunas, with Poland annexing the Vilnius region. The most extreme option was the 
direct annexation of Lithuania into Poland. 
The Conference opened in Brussels on April 20, 1921, with Count Sobanski and 
Simon Askenazy heading the Polish delegation and Finance Minister Ernestas 
Galvanauskas as head of the Lithuanian delegation. 108 Galvanauskas was authorized to 
use all means necessary to reach agreement with Poland, as long as he accomplished 
Lithuania's only goal of returning Vilnius and surrounding territory to Lithuania. 
Askenazy offered his "federation" proposal and wanted to discuss the overall relations 
between Lithuania and Poland, rather than Vilnius in particular. Lithuania was wary 
about joining into any federation with Poland, finding it difficult to see how the 
arrangement would truly be equal; thirty million Poles would overwhelm the three 
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million Lithuanians.109 Nevertheless, Lithuania was willing to discuss the entire spectrum 
of options with Poland, as long as Warsaw recognized the independence of Lithuania 
with its capital at Vilnius. 
After a month of intense discussion, Hymans, who was mediating the Conference, 
submitted a proposal on May 20, 1921.110 The "first" Hymans plan called for the 
formation of a Lithuanian Federal State with two equal autonomous cantons of Vilnius 
and Kaunas based on the Swiss Model. Lithuania and Poland would share a common 
council for foreign affairs, a defensive military convention, an economic convention with 
free trade, and Polish commerce would have free use of Lithuanian ports and territory. 
Although neither side favored the proposal, both sides agreed to accept it as a basis for 
discussion. Lithuania voiced its concerns to the Conference on May 24. Galvanauskas 
doubted that the Swiss model could apply to Lithuania. He also argued that Poland would 
dominate the various institutions of the proposed federation. He feared Lithuania would 
be drawn into Polish conflicts that did not concern Lithuania. Overall, Galvanauskas felt 
that the Hymans Plan would infringe upon Lithuanian sovereignty.111 The Lithuanians 
would neither adopt nor reject the proposal, but use it as a basis of discussion. Poland 
also accepted the Hymans Plan as basis for discussion, but demanded that Zeligowski's 
statelet of Central Lithuania be included in negotiations. Lithuania strongly objected to 
this request, as it would violate the resolution of March 3, 1921, which stipulated that 
there would be direct negotiations between Lithuania and Poland without the influence of 
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third parties. Furthermore, Lithuania did not want to legitimize Zeligowski's actions. 
Hymans ultimately rejected the Polish request. Thus, the first Hymans Plan resulted in 
stalemate and ultimately failed. 
Lithuania and Poland met again at the next Council meeting at Brussels on July 
27, 1921, to resume negotiations. As soon as the talks began, it became clear that some 
way had to be found to get around the situation caused by Zeligowski and his troops. On 
June 28, the Council adopted a resolution that stated any agreement must be approved by 
the diets of both Lithuania and Poland, as well as a subsequent diet to be formed in 
Vilnius.112 The resolution also proposed that Zeligowski's troops should be replaced by a 
police force under the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations. The 
League would also create a local militia in Vilnius. Finally, the League called for the 
partial demobilization of the Lithuanian Army. Although Poland accepted the resolution, 
the Lithuanian government felt unable to accept it, finding the provision for ratification 
by the Vilnius Diet the chief objection. After yet another failed peace conference, both 
sides became frustrated and retreated to their original positions. Lithuania demanded that 
Poland observe the Suwalki agreement and restore the status quo before Zeligowski's 
military seizure of Vilnius. Poland considered Vilnius as a part of Poland and claimed to 
respect the local population's right to self-determination. 
Hymans invited the two governments to meet at Geneva on August 25, 1921, to 
continue the peace process. On September 3, Hymans submitted his "second" proposal.113 
According to the new proposal, Vilnius would become autonomous rather than a canton, 
although the links between Lithuania and Poland as foreseen in the first plan would 
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remain. Aware of the outcome of the first proposal, Hymans instructed the sides to give 
an opinion on the plan as a whole, not just separate provisions. The Lithuanian delegation 
accepted the plan as a basis of discussion, with the intention of editing numerous articles. 
Poland rejected the Hyman plan and made it known that it would not accept anything less 
than the June 28 resolution, which it had conditionally accepted.114 
Paul Hymans, after having exerted much energy and effort, was forced to 
capitulate in the face of historic Lithuanian-Polish enmity. On one side, the Poles were 
unwilling to recognize a Lithuanian separate state based on continuity with the historic 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and they tended to look down upon anything Lithuanian. 115 
On the other side, the Lithuanians were stubborn, impatient, and suspicious of their 
negotiating partners. 116 At the following Council meeting on September 10, 1921, 
Hymans gave a long account of the dispute and asked the League Council to approve his 
second plan not as a basis for discussion, but as a draft treaty. The League Council 
endorsed Hymans's revised plan and referred the matter to the League Assembly. The 
League Assembly heard both Polish and Lithuanian delegations and approved the second 
Hymans plan. In an attempt to win Lithuanian support for the second Hymans plan, the 
League of Nations admitted Lithuania on September 22, 1921, although the Western 
powers had yet to grant it de jure recognition. Despite this small victory, Lithuania had 
little faith in the organization.117 Lithuanian public opinion was clearly against the 
negotiations in Brussels and Geneva, as well as the Hymans plan. After reevaluating the 
most recent of Hymans's draft proposals, the Lithuanian government sent a letter to the 
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League on December 24, 1921, stating it also found it impossible to accept the "second" 
Hymans plan. Thus, after many efforts, the Council found its proposals unacceptable to 
both governments. 
On November 16, 1921, the parliament (Sejm) in Warsaw announced elections in 
the Vilnius district for members of an assembly that would decide the fate of the district, 
to be held on January 8, 1922. The right to vote was given to all resident adults. The 
results were not surprising; the region's Poles participated quite enthusiastically, whereas 
the Lithuanians, Jews, and Belarussians either boycotted the polls or participated 
minimally. In the city of Vilnius, only 54.8 percent of the registered electorate voted; of 
Jews eligible to vote, only 1.4 percent participated.118 Of Lithuanians who according to 
official statistics made up 7.2 percent of the region's inhabitants, only 7 percent voted. 119 
The Lithuania government did not recognize the legitimacy of the vote nor its results. 
The League of Nations Military Commission, which observed the vote, complained about 
flagrant irregularities. 120 The election was organized and managed exclusively by Poles, 
most voters did not show their cards of identity, and the elections were carried out under 
Polish military occupation. They concluded that the Vilnius Sejm (Diet) could not be 
considered a "true and sincere expression" of the region's inhabitants.121 
On January 13, 1922, the Council officially ended its efforts to mediate the 
dispute, acknowledging its failure and its inability to change the fact of Polish 
occupation. Furthermore, it also announced that it would withdraw the Military 
Commission of Control within one month. In its decision the League added, "It [the 
118 Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question, 85. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Grauzinis, 491. 
121 Zalys, 84. 
43 
League] cannot recognize a solution of a dispute referred to the League of Nations by one 
of its members, ifthat solution was made without regard to the proposal of the Council or 
without the agreement of both interested parties."122 On February 17, 1922, the Military 
Commission withdrew, and the neutral zone fell into a state of anarchy. The population 
was abandoned to its fate, having neither a government nor a regular administration. 
Attempting to seize the opportunity, propagandist organizations from both Poland and 
Lithuania entered the zone under the guise of "militias." These bands were heavily armed 
and desired less to keep the peace than to conquer the zone.123 
The Vilnius Sejm thus elected was composed exclusively of Polish delegates. At 
the first session there was only one item on the agenda, the determination of relations 
with Poland. On February 20, 1922, the Vilnius Sejm adopted a resolution on formal 
union with Poland, which passed with a vote of 96-6. 124 The Sejm immediately send a 
dispatch to Warsaw proclaiming that the Vilnius district was to be incorporated into 
Poland. On March 24, 1922, the Warsaw Sejm ratified the act of union. The Lithuanians 
offered various proposals, from continuation of direct talks to adjudication at the 
International Court of Justice at the Hague, but Polish-Lithuanian relations were now at a 
stalemate. Proclaiming that Vilnius Sejm of Central Lithuania supported unconditional 
incorporation into Poland, Warsaw refused any further talks on the question. 
During the Council Meeting at Geneva on May 16, 1922, the Council requested 
that both governments establish a provisional border and release all political prisoners. 
During the meeting, Lithuania made a final plea to the Council to protect the neutral 
122 Simas Suziedelis and Antanas Vasaitis, eds., "Vilnius, Conflict with Poland," Encyclopedia 
Lituanica 6 (Boston: Juozas Kapocius, 1978), 169. 
123 Brockelbank, 494. 
124 Ibid. 
44 
zone.12
5 Furthermore, the Lithuanian government asked. the Council to draw the attention 
of the Great Powers to the urgent necessity of tracing the eastern frontiers of Poland 
under the power given to them by Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles. Lithuania 
continued to insist upon the supremacy of the Treaty of Suwalki, however Poland refused 
to acknowledge that treaty. The League refused, citing the fact that the neutral zone no 
longer existed, and that the responsibilities were too great for the League to handle.126 
The League, however, did send in August of 1922 Pedro Saura of Spain and Dr. Stojan 
Lasic of the Yugoslavia to observe the situation in Vilnius first hand. In December, Saura 
presented his report to the League. 127 It gave a brief history of the violence and anarchy 
that had existed in the region since the withdrawal of the Military Commission of Control 
in February. He recommended the drawing of a provisional line, which gave practically 
the entire Vilnius region to Poland. 
Resolution 
On February 3, 1923, the Council adopted a resolution laying down a provisional 
line of demarcation to be observed by the Lithuanian and Polish governments after 
February 15.128 This line followed the one recommended in the Saura report and awarded 
the Grodno-Vilnius-Daugavpils railway to Poland. The cities of Sirvintos and Giedraiciai 
were returned to Lithuanian control. Poland immediately accepted this resolution and 
proceeded to occupy the portion of the zone assigned to it. Organized Lithuanian 
opposition clashed with Polish forces near the cities of Lejpuny and Klepaczi, where 
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fighting continued for ten more days. 129 To finalize the incorporation of the Vilnius 
region into Poland, Poland asked the Conference of Ambassadors, which was meeting in 
Paris, to recognize its eastern borders with Lithuania and the Soviet Union. On March 15, 
1923, the Conference of Ambassadors made its momentous decision regulating the whole 
Vilnius question.130 The Conference recognized the Russo-Polish frontier as fixed by the 
Treaty of Riga of 1921, which was signed by both Poland and Russia, and recognized the 
Lithuanian-Polish frontier as fixed on February 3, 1923. This final stroke was a victory 
for Poland, who had gained approximately 6,000 square miles. 
On April 16, 1923, Lithuania addressed a note to Raymond Poincare, President of 
the Conference of Ambassadors, formally refusing to recognize the validity of the 
decision of March 15.131 Lithuania's objections can be summarized into six major 
categories. (1) Any right of the Conference of Ambassadors to fix Lithuania's boundaries 
came from Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, which Lithuania did not sign, and thus 
the treaty does not apply to Lithuania. (2) The Conference of Ambassadors was aware of 
this principle, and had recognized it in regard to Russia because its decision followed the 
line specified by the Treaty of Riga. (3) The Conference of Ambassadors referred to 
Lithuania's note of November 18, 1922, as being a voluntary submission of the question 
to the Conference. This note, however, asked the Great Powers to use the right conferred 
on them by Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles to fix the Eastern boundaries of Poland 
"taking into account the solemn engagement of that state towards the Lithuanian state and 
the vital interests and rights of Lithuania." The Conference of Ambassadors quotes only 
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the first part of the note and does not quote the part quoted here. Since the decision did 
not take into account the "solemn engagement of Poland towards Lithuania" (the 
Sulwalki agreement) the decision was beyond the powers given by the note of November 
18, 1922. ( 4) The right to be exercised by the Great Powers naturally involved the 
assumption of an agreement by the states involved, deriving its power from the Treaty of 
Versailles. Lithuania, however, did not sign this agreement. ( 5) Any reliance by the 
Conference of Ambassadors on the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations of 
January 13, 1922, May 17, 1922, or February 3, 1923, was invalidated by the fact that 
Lithuania never accepted them and the Council had no power to impose them without 
Lithuania's consent. Thus the Conference was trying to legalize a de facto situation. (6) 
There was no representative of Lithuania at the Conference of Ambassadors, and 
Lithuania was given no chance to be heard. Although Lithuania refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of this decision, Poland and the Great Powers considered the Vilnius dispute 
settled. 132 
Polish occupation of the Vilnius province (1920-39) did not radically change the 
ethnicity of the area. Three demographic changes, however, were noticeable in the 
region.133 (1) Overall decreases in both rural and urban populations due to seven years of 
warfare. (2) A decrease in the Jewish population because most of the 1915 evacuees to 
Russia did not return. (3) An influx of Polish soldiers, administrators, civil servants, and 
their families to fill various administrative and commercial positions created by Polish 
imperialism. During the occupation, an intense "Polonization" propaganda campaign was 
conducted. As a result, every census from this period conducted by Polish authorities was 
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extremely pro-Polish. Over zealous Polish census takers would list all Catholics and all 
Polish speakers as Poles.134 These inflated figures were then relied upon to justify their 
claims to the region. In 1921, the Poles claimed that Vilnius County had only 10,738 
Lithuanians; contrasted by local Lithuanian leaders who said that Lithuanians numbered 
41,050. 135 Unfortunately, no objective data for the differentiation of the population of the 
Vilnius region during the interwar period is available. 
The Warsaw government did conduct two official republic-wide censuses, on 
September 30, 1921 and December 9, 1931.136 The official figures are in Table 7: 
Table 7: Po.12ulation Com.12osition (according to the Polish Censuses of 1921 and 1931) 
County Po.12ulation Poles Polish-Speaking Non-Poles Non-Polish-Speaking 
1921 1931 1931 1931 1921 1931 
Bresiauja 124,036 142,475 70,554 93,947 53,482 48,501 
Dysna 139,569 159,546 59,688 62,513 79,881 97,033 
Asmena 70,021 104,633 ? 85,299 ? 19,334 
Pasto vis 83,466 99,836 ? 47,857 ? 51,979 
Svencionys 118,819 136,305 ? 68,424 ? 67,881 
Vileika 103,914 130,927 ? 59,636 ? 71,291 
Vilnius 128,954 196,383 ? 129,660 ? 66,723 
Trakai 159,229 214,070 ? 180,569 ? 33,501 
Lyda 148,073 183,431 123,342 145,732 24,731 37,699 
Total 1,1076,0811,367,606 873,664 511,741 
Every Polish census found fewer and fewer Lithuanians in the Vilnius region. Even so, 
the 1931 census shows that after eleven years of Polish rule, 40.1 percent of the 
inhabitants of Vilnius still could not speak Polish. 137 These figures are suspect, since the 
Polish census takers were fitting the facts to their predetermined conclusions. 
The March 15, 1923, decision of the Conference of Ambassadors not only left 
Lithuania and Poland in a state of "no peace, no war," but had the effect of erecting an 
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impenetrable barrier along the line of demarcation between Lithuania and Poland. No 
traffic or mail passed through the border, and communications remained cut off for 
fifteen years. Until Nazi Germany's expansionism of the late 1930s, no two European 
states exhibited such open mutual hostility.138 In an attempt to ease this tense situation, 
the Conference of Ambassadors urged the two governments to begin direct negotiations 
in order to open normal relations. Negotiations began on September 1, 1925, in 
Copenhagen and continued from September 15 until October 15 in Lugano, Switzerland, 
but they yielded no results. 
As the threat of war arose in 1927 and relations became more strained, Lithuania 
appealed to the League ofNations. On December 10, 1927, the League Council adopted a 
resolution that announced peace between the two countries and proposed that direct talks 
should begin with the purpose of achieving good relations, while leaving out of account 
questions on which the two states differed. Talks were held in Konigsberg, Warsaw, and 
Kaunas. During the discussions, Polish representatives recognized and respected the 
sovereignty ofLithuania. 139 The only other result was an agreement, signed on November 
7, 1928, concerning the improvement of the condition of farms that were divided or 
separated by Poland's acquisition of the Vilnius region. At the insistence of Poland, the 
League Council sought the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the 
Hague about restoring communications between Lithuania and Poland. Specifically, 
Poland was inquiring as to whether the circumstances at the time under international 
agreements required Lithuania to open the railroad between Lentvaris and Kaisiadorys. 
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On January 24, 1931, the Hague Court responded that current international agreements 
did not require Lithuania to do so. 
This hostility continued until 1938, when on March 7 a Lithuanian sentry shot and 
killed a Polish border-militiaman who was hiding on the Lithuanian side of the border. 
Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Polish government delivered an ultimatum to 
Lithuania on March 17. Threatening force if Lithuania did not comply, Poland demanded 
that Lithuania restore rail and road communications, telephone and telegraph 
communications for diplomatic representatives, and it had to send a representative to 
Warsaw and accept a representative of Poland in Kaunas. Lithuania complied with the 
ultimatum, observing that it was yielding to force, not to what was right. Poland and 
Lithuania signed a treaty in Augustavas on March 30, 1938.140 The question of Vilnius 
arose at the international level again after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed on 
August 23, 1939. In the secret protocol attached to this agreement, Germany and the 
Soviet Union recognized the rights and interests of Lithuania in the Vilnius region.141 
After Poland collapsed and the Soviets occupied Vilnius in the fall of 1939, the city was 
handed over to Lithuania on October 10 in accordance with a treaty made in Moscow. 142 
By this treaty Lithuania had to give up extensive territory for the benefit of the Soviet 
Union, although under the Moscow Treaty of 1920, that territory belonged to Lithuania. 
The Vilnius question was but one of the many territorial conflicts that plagued 
Eastern Europe between the World Wars. Parallels to the dispute can also be found more 
recently in Israeli-Arab or Indian-Pakistan relations. What makes the Lithuanian-Polish 
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dispute so unique is that the Lithuanians insisted that the contested region included their 
capital. The heart of the problem lay in the ideology of Lithuanian nationalism. 
Lithuanian nationalism had to justify itself, and its proponents based their case for 
political independence on the glories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had its 
capital in Vilnius. To renounce Vilnius was the equivalent of renouncing independence 
itself. Even after gaining their long-sought-after independence, most Lithuanian leaders 
still could not free themselves of this mindset. 
Vilnius, however, was a diverse city that contained numerous nationalities. The 
Vilnius province was a cultural frontier where linguistic and cultural boundaries mingled 
and blurred. Nationalism, both political and cultural, among the inhabitants, appeared 
only during the last years of the nineteenth century. Vilnius was a problematic nightmare 
to the ethnologist, diplomat, and historian alike, as it defied any delineation of national-
ethnic boundaries. Demographic data, mainly because of the national bias of various 
census takers, have only added to the ethnological confusion, as scholars were confronted 
with contradictory statistical data. 
The Lithuanian nationalists insisted on the formation of their own national state, 
and in a multi-national region, this inevitably had to bring conflict. Even though 
Lithuanians had enjoyed considerable sympathy among Vilnius's Jews, the Lithuanians 
failed to win the loyalty of the city's entire population, or even a majority. They could 
offer no defense of the city against Zeligowski' s coup de force in October 1920. Unable 
to regain Vilnius by themselves, Lithuania's leaders considered all international problems 
in the context of the Vilnius question, and this attitude persisted into the first year of 
World War II. Despite Lithuania's lip service to the League of Nations; its foreign policy 
51 
was based entirely on anti-Polish feelings. In the long run, however, the resolution of the 
Vilnius question was in hands of neither the Poles nor the Lithuanians, but in the hands of 
the Great Powers. 
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